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Abstract
The present exploratory paper investigates whether sequential actions can be learned
through a trial and error approach known as model-free reinforcement learning and
describes mechanisms by which this could occur. To that end, we modelled human
behavior on an adapted sequential response time task (SRT) (Nissen and Bullemer,
1987) using a reinforcement learning agent. Measures for visuospatial working memory,
fluid intelligence, locus of control and personal need for structure were also taken. The
bimodal distribution of final score on the SRT suggested the presence of dual learning
processes, so a median split was conducted on final score. In regression, low scoring
participants’ final scores were best predicted by fluid intelligence combined with
exploration parameter τ . High scoring participants’ final scores could not be predicted
from cognitive attributes and could only be explained by parameter α. Our results
provide evidence that people use different learning strategies when learning a sequence
and explains previous ambiguous results with regards to the roles of intelligence and
working memory in human sequence learning.
Keywords: SRT, reinforcement learning, dual processes, sequential action, motor
sequence acquisition.
Word count: 7108 words.
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Introduction
Reinforcement learning constitutes a class of algorithms that originate in early
animal experiments in which a behavior was learned by rewarding the animal. For
example, Thorndike (1911) conducted experiments in which dogs and cats learned,
through trial and error, to pull a rope in order to escape from an uncomfortable box.
The amount of time it took an animal to escape decreased in proportion to the number
of times the experiment was conducted, presumably because the animal learned the
correct behavior (pulling the rope) as a result of being rewarded (through escape).
Thorndike’s Law of Effect codified how the animals learned this behavior (Thorndike,
1911, p. 244):
"Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are
accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other
things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that,
when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those which are
accompanied or closely followed by discomfort to the animal will, other
things being equal, have their connections with that situation weakened, so
that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur. The greater the
satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the strengthening or weakening of the
bond."
Otherwise stated, animals whose behavior in a specific environment was followed
by a reward were more likely to exhibit that same behavior when reintroduced to that
same environment. Skinner (1935) further investigated this phenomenon, studying how
pigeons learned to press a lever in response to a food delivery. Operant conditioning
became the description of how rewarding a specific behavior increases both its
frequency and its likelihood of occurring. However, while Skinner’s account has been
very successful both in describing and predicting how reward influences an action,
operant conditioning could not account for how multiple action-reward sets are chained
into action sequences, as is commonly found in human behavior.
Whether riding a bicycle, making a cup of tea, doing groceries or having a
conversation, much of every-day human behavior is in some way dependent on the
successful acquisition of a sequence of actions. Early accounts of action sequence
acquisition proposed linking actions into action chains. For example, James’ chaining
model described how, in a learned action sequence, the sensory consequence of a
preceding action would activate the stimulus representation of the sensory consequence
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of the next action, which would automatically trigger the action required to generate
that consequence (James, Burkhardt, Bowers, and Skrupskelis, 1890). However, James’
chaining model could account for neither the absence of bidirectionality nor temporal
delays in every-day action plans, nor could it explain goal directed action. While
solutions to the problems of bidirectionality, temporal delay and goal direction were
proposed (see Münsterberg, 1889; Greenwald, 1970 and Hull, 1931 respectively), the
mechanism by which humans learn action sequences has remained opaque, in particular
when the sequence is learned by trial and error and without instruction.
Action sequence learning using trial and error occurs when a positive or negative
reward results from one of the actions in the sequence, thus causing the action to be
more or less likely to be repeated. For example, a scraped knee and accompanying pain
is a negative reward, signaling that an element of the action sequence "riding a bike" has
been insufficiently acquired. The next attempt at acquiring this action sequence might
consist of placing one leg on either side of the bike, as opposed to on the same side. The
thrill of successfully keeping the bicycle upright will feel rewarding, causing the action
of placing legs on either side to be repeated, contributing to eventual successful
acquisition of the "riding a bike" action sequence.
Reinforcement learning provides a framework that incorporates intermittent
reward, temporal delay and goal setting, thus providing a framework for action
sequence learning. In addition, Niv (2009) provides 2 reasons why RL is an ideal
normative framework within which to investigate animal sequence learning. First, RL
provides an evolutionary plausible mechanism because the ability of an animal to
maximize a reward will often provide fitness advantages. Second, behavioral
discrepancies between animal and algorithm allow us to investigate the animal’s
decision-making and the function it is optimizing.
Figure 1 . Schematic representation of a reinforcement learning paradigm (Sutton and
Barto, 2018)
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The RL process can be conceptualized using Figure 1. Here, we see an agent
acting on its environment at time t (At), and an environment that returns to the agent
the reward (Rt+1) and state change (St+1) that result from the agent’s action. The
agent then uses the information from the environment to assess the value of the action
it just took, which, in turn, influences what action the agent will take the next time it
encounters state St. As such, RL algorithms learn "on the job": Exploring the
environment when necessary, and exploiting it when it has found optimal behavior.
Reinforcement learning has been widely applied to teach machines to behave
optimally. For example, RL has been used to optimize traffic light behavior at a
complicated intersection(Arel, Liu, Urbanik, and Kohls, 2010), control a helicopter
autonomously (Kim, Jordan, Sastry, and Ng, 2004), learn and play backgammon
(Tesauro, 1995) and checkers (Schaeffer, Hlynka, and Jussila, 2001) at human
performance or better, and control bipedal motion in robots (Collins, Ruina, Tedrake,
and Wisse, 2005). In contrast, rather than seeking to optimize behavior in an applied
approach, the present study sets out to a RL agent to simulate -often profoundly
sub-optimal- human behavior. This approach to RL has the potential to not only teach
us how humans learn sequences, but to teach us how to make machines learn and
behave more like humans.
One of the most ubiquitous paradigms for human sequence acquisition is Nissen
and Bullemer’s serial response time task (SRT) (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987). In the
classical version of the SRT, participants are tasked to press one of four buttons in
response to a stimulus cue displayed on a screen. Unbeknownst to participants, the cue
is not random but follows a repeating 10 digit sequence. In the SRT, response times for
all participants generally decrease even when participants exhibit no explicit knowledge
of the sequence at the conclusion of the task. However, human motor sequence learning
is often characterized by uncued trial and error exploration as opposed to responding to
a cue, casting doubt on the suitability of the classical cued SRT in studying human
motor sequence learning.
In response, Kachergis, Berends, de Kleijn, and Hommel (2016) adapted the SRT
to incorporate uncued exploration. This adapted SRT, or sequential learning task
(SLT), replaced the single visual onscreen cue with a screen divided into 4 quadrants.
The top right corner also displayed a score. Participants were tasked to maximize their
score by navigating the 4 quadrants using their mouse cursor. Unbeknownst to
participants, a repeating sequence of 10 moves would maximize their score. Participant
behavior was initially characterized by trial and error exploration, however, once the
sequence had been acquired, participants exploited there knowledge and showed very
little exploration. The authors successfully modeled this behavior using an influential
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RL model of trial and error sequence learning known as a temporal difference (TD)
algorithm. Critically, the environment exhibited 2 properties. First, a correct movement
can only be predicted from 2 previous moves. Thus, one could reason that higher
intelligence and working memory capacity would lead to a higher score. Second, the
SLT paradigm can be mapped onto a decision process that exhibits the Markov
property. Specifically, for any movement can be computed a value that characterizes the
entire reward history of that movement, thus foregoing the need to memorize the 2
previous moves when predicting whether a movement is correct.
The present study seeks to repeat Kachergis et al.’s (2016) method using
Q-learning, and examine the relationships between the algorithm, participants’ final
scores and participant’s cognitive and personality attributes.
Q-learning
Q-learning is an off-policy model-free TD RL algorithm that teaches agents to act
optimally in an environment comprised of discrete states (Watkins, 1989). Model-free
reinforcement learners aim to find a policy, or sequence of actions, that maximizes
reward. Critically, model-free RL agents have no a-priori suppositions about reward
function or transition probabilities associated with the environment. In order to learn
an optimal policy, a model-free RL agent simply assigns values to actions based on
received reward. Off-policy agents update all their state action values pairs (or
Q-values) in their current state using the most valuable action in the next state. The
Q-learning environment is represented by a table in which rows represent all possible
states (St ∈ S) and columns represent all possible actions (At ∈ A). This table, also
known as a Q-table, is frequently initialized with zero’s or random values
(Q(St, At)~N (0, 1)). These Q-values are updated as the agent receives rewards for
choosing actions. The agent’s goal is to find an optimal policy which maximizes reward.
In the SLT only a correct action yields positive reward and progression to the next
state/quadrant. Hence, the optimal policy translates to the sequence of actions that
always leads to progression to the next state. Each time an agent enters a state, the
Q-values corresponding to available actions within that state are updated by adding to
them the reward the agent would receive by taking an action, plus the (discounted)
reward the agent would receive if it took the highest valued action in the next state.
The full process of updating Q-values translates to equation 1.
Q(St, At)← (1− α) ·Q(St, At) + α · [Rt+1 + γmax
a
Q(St+1, a)] (1)
Equation 1 contains 2 parameters: A learning rate (α) and a future reward
discount parameter (γ). The Q-value Q(St, At) represents the value of taking action A
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while in state S at time t. Rt+1 represents a scalar reward that was received by having
taken action A in state S at time t. γmaxaQ(St+1, a) represents the value of the most
valuable action to take in the state resulting from taking action A from state S at time
t, discounted by γ.
Q-learning is an off-policy algorithm, which means that when the agent resides in
a state, all Q-values in that state are updated. This is contrasted with on-policy
algorithms, in which only the Q-value of the action taken is updated. Once all Q-values
in the state in which the agent resides have been updated, the agent needs to select an
action based on these updated values. Choosing the correct action leads to progression
to the next state, and a positive reward. Choosing the incorrect action leads to a
negative reward. To learn the policy that maximizes score, the agent balances greedily
taking the highest valued action with exploration of sub-optimal options.
Action selection methods
Q-learning, however, leaves open the question of how to balance exploration, i.e.
the random selection of an action, with exploitation, in which the agent greedily selects
the action with the highest Q-value.
-Greedy action selection. In -Greedy action selection, the agent acts either
totally at random, or totally greedily (see Equation 2). The probability of the agent
acting randomly is given by a scalar .
pi(s) =

random action, if a randomly generated number > 
maxaQ(St, a), else
(2)
We implemented an additional parameter, random action decay rate (RADR),
which decays the random action rate  over time, allowing the agent to exhibit high ,
exploratory behavior at the start of the task, and act more greedily with a low  at the
end of the task.
Softmax action selection. A second action selection method uses the softmax
function (see equation 3) to convert Q-values to action probabilities.
Pt(a) =
e
Q(s,a)
τ∑
A e
Q(s,A)
τ
(3)
The temperature or τ parameter modulates the exploration/exploitation ratio.
High values of τ have the effect of making each action equally likely, regardless of the
underlying Q-value, while low levels of τ cause actions with high Q-values to be more
likely to be chosen than actions with low Q-values.
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To model our participant’s behavior we can thus combine our q-learner with 2
separate action selection methods.
The present study
In the present study, we used the SLT and reinforcement learning to investigate
how humans learn motor sequences. First, we investigated the relationship between
participant performance on the SLT and participant’s cognitive and personality
attributes. Then, we modeled participant’s behavior using our Q-learner. We
subsequently investigated the mechanism by which human cognitive and personality
attributes influenced performance on the paradigm by exploring the relationships
between 3 parameters of our Q-learner and our participant’s cognitive attributes.
Lastly, we explored the differences in learning mechanism between high scoring and low
scoring participants. This study was strictly exploratory and thus, we did not specificity
any a-priori hypotheses.
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Method
Participants
Forty participants (13 male) of mean age 20.79 years (SD = 2.34) were recruited
from the Leiden University undergraduate student population. All participants had
normal or corrected to normal vision and were compensated for their participation with
either course credit or e 6.50.
Procedure
All participants gave their informed consent prior to participation in the study.
Participants were then seated in front of a computer screen, where the remainder of the
study was administered. Prior to administering the sequential learning task (SLT) we
administered questionnaires measuring participants’ cognitive and personality attributes
in areas we believed could influence performance on the SLT: personal need for
structure, locus of control, visuospatial working memory and fluid intelligence. All the
questionnaires and the subsequent SLT were administered in a single sitting, with a
5-minute break between the questionnaires and the SLT. In addition to the SLT, all
participants also completed a trajectory serial reaction time task (SRT), the results of
which are not discussed here. The order of the SLT and SRT was counter balanced.
Materials
Four instruments were used to measure our participants’ cognitive and personality
attributes.
Figure 2 . Example item
from Raven’s Standard
Progressive Matrices. Not an
actual test item.
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Fluid intelligence. We measured fluid intelligence using Raven’s Standard
Progressive Matrices (RSPM) (Raven, Raven, and Court, 1998). Fluid intelligence is
posited to underlie an individuals reasoning, pattern recognition and problem solving
skills and the RSPM has been found to be a valid and reliable measure (Diamond,
2013). The RSPM presents participants with a series of images in a 3x3 or 4x4 matrix,
with one image missing. The participant is instructed to fill in the missing image by
choosing from a list of images. An example test item is shown in Figure 2. Score was
measured as the number of correct items in a 10-inute interval. We expected that
participants with a high fluid intelligence would recognize the underlying pattern in the
SLT more quickly, leading to both a steeper score trajectory and higher final score.
Visuospatial working memory. Visuospatial working memory was tested
using a computer task from Bo, Jennett, and Seidler (2011). Participants were
presented with an array of colored circles followed by a 900-ms blank screen, after which
a test array was presented for 2000-ms. Afterwards, participants were asked whether
the test array was the same (s) or different (d) and asked to press the corresponding key
on a keyboard. We expected that higher working memory scores would result in steeper
score trajectories and higher scores on the SLT. Figure 3 illustrates the task. Working
memory capacity was measured as K = Size of the array * (observed hit rate - false
alarm rate) (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004).
Figure 3 . Visuospatial working memory task.
Locus of control. We measured locus of control using the 24 item Levenson
Multidimensional Locus of Control Scales (LMLCS) (Levenson, 1981). The locus of
control construct describes an individual’s tendency to attribute a situation either
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internally as a result of one’s own behavior, or externally as a result of forces over which
one has no control. Each item, for example: Whether or not I get to be a leader depends
mostly on my ability, can be answered on a Likert scale from -3 (strongly disagree) to
+3 (strongly agree). A high total score indicates an internal locus of control. We
assumed that people with a high and thus internal locus of control would be quicker to
recognize their score was related to their behavior on the SLT, hence leading to a higher
final score and steeper score trajectory.
Personal need for structure. We measured PNS using the 12 item Personal
Need for Structure scale (Thompson, Naccarato, and Parker, 1989). Personal need for
structure (PNS) relates to an individual’s tendency to reduce chaos in one’s
environment by seeking out structure (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, and Moskowitz,
2001). Each item, for example: It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what
to expect from it, can be answered on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). A high total score indicates a high need for structure. We expected
that higher scores on PNS would result in steeper score trajectories and higher scores on
the SLT task.
Explicit knowledge. After concluding the SLT, we asked participants whether
they suspected a sequence was present. If answered affirmatively, we asked them to
reproduce the sequence. Only if the participant correctly reproduced the sequence did
we encode the participant as having explicit knowledge. However, due to anomalies
such as a high scoring participant saying they had no knowledge of the sequence and
low scoring participants accurately reproducing the sequence, we did not use this
variable for further analysis. In stead, we conducted a median split on final score, in
order to separate the people who had learned sequence from the people who didn’t.
Sequential learning task. The sequential learning task (SLT) constituted our
study’s main task. We used the sequential action computer task from Kachergis et al.
(2016). The participant is sat in front of a computer screen divided into 4 quadrants,
each quadrant containing a blue target square. The top right corner contains a score
counter. The participant is instructed to navigate the four target squares swith a mouse
while trying to maximize his score. When a participant moves his mouse pointer to a
"correct" square it momentarily turns green, his score is incremented by +1 and the
mouse pointer remains in place. In contrast, moving his mouse pointer to an incorrect
square results in a score deduction of -1, causes the mouse pointer to jump back to the
previous position and momentarily turns the square red. Unbeknownst to the
participant, a specific sequence of 10 moves maximizes his score. This sequence is a
variant of the 10 digit sequence used by Nissen and Bullemer in the SRT
(3-2-4-2-1-4-3-4-2-1) (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987)). The sequence has the property that
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each number in the sequence is predicted by the 2 preceding numbers. In the SLT, each
number is mapped to a target square (1 = top left, 2 = top right, 3 = bottom left, 4 =
bottom right). Figure 4 shows an example setup. No information is given as to the fact
that a sequence exists, nor is a participant informed when he has completed the
sequence. The only available clues to the fact that a correct movement was made is the
increased score counter, the square’s momentary color change and the fact that the
mouse cursor remained in place. The sequence automatically repeated itself until 80
successful traversions of the sequence had been completed. A perfectly scoring
participant would thus have completed the experiment after 800 moves, and will have
collected 800 points in the process. In contrast, if a participant had made 1500 moves
but had not traversed the sequence 80 times the experiment was ended.
Figure 4 . Example setup for sequential learning task
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Results
Behavioral results
Forty participants underwent the SLT, all of which completed the task within
1500 moves (M = 1074.4, SD = 208.02). Sample characteristics are shown in Table 1.
All distributions with the exception of final score were normal or approximately normal
(see Figure A1 (Appendix)).
Correlations. First, we investigated which cognitive and personality attributes
were related to performance on the SLT.
From Figures B1 through B4 (Appendix) we concluded that the relationships
between final score and cognitive and personality attributes were sufficiently linear to
warrant interpretation of correlations.
Participants’ cognitive and personality attribute scores were correlated with SLT
final score (see Table 1). Both visuospatial working memory (working memory)
(r(38)= .35, p = .029) and fluid intelligence (r(38)= .46, p = .003) were significantly,
positively associated with final score. Fluid intelligence and working memory appear
relatively orthogonal (r(38) = .22, p = .163).
Table 1
Correlation table of cognitive and personality attributes and final score.
M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Final score 523.800 207.528 -
2. Working memory 2.450 0.716 .35 (.029) -
3. Locus of control 35.550 4.443 .07 (.662) -.05 (.778) -
4. Personal need for structure 45.050 7.246 .02 (.912) -.13 (.440) .24 (.130) -
5. Fluid intelligence 24.675 3.237 .46 (.003) .22 (.163) -.21 (.193) -.12 (.471)
Note 1: Significant correlations (p < .05) are bold-faced.
Note 2: Unless otherwise specified, values indicate Pearson correlations, values in
brackets indicate p-values.
Linear regression. Next, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression of final
score onto cognitive and personality attributes. Assumptions were checked using
Figures D1 to D4 (Appendix). To remedy heteroscedasticity we squared our response
variable, final score. Starting with only fluid intelligence as a predictor, we added
working memory, locus of control and personal need for structure sequentially. Table F1
(Appendix) shows statistics for all models. Adding working memory to the fluid
COMPUTATIONAL CORRELATES OF INTELLIGENCE AND WORKING
MEMORY 14
intelligence model improved the model to a degree approaching significance
(F (1, 37) = 2.970, p = .094), while the remaining predictors did not improve the model.
Non-linearity of the relationship between working memory and final score,
combined with the fact that working memory correlates significantly with final score
and that working memory capacity is different for low and high scoring participants, led
to us include working memory in our final model, despite the fact that it’s inclusion did
not significantly improve the model statistically. Our final model predicted final score
from a linear combination of fluid intelligence and working memory capacity
(F (2, 37) = 5.573, p = .008), and explained 19% of the variance in our data
(R2adj = .19). Fluid intelligence significantly predicted final score (squared)
(b = 21153.16, t(38) = 2.38, p = .022), however, working memory only approached
significance (b = 69903.25, t(38) = 1.74, p = .090).
Figure 5 . Cooks D for all subjects, line is at 4∗ the mean Cook’s D.
Lastly, Figure 5 shows 2 multivariate outliers, participants 13 and 14. However,
inspection of these participants on other variables did not justify their removal from the
model. The final model did not show multicollinearity (VIF = 1.05, tolerance = .95).
Bimodality of final score. Visual inspection of Figure 6 provided evidence of
bimodality of final score.
Figure 6 . Histogram of final score, lines are at quantiles 0, .25, .50, .75 and 1.00
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Bimodality can be indicative of sampling from 2 populations with different modes
of processing (Freeman and Dale, 2013). Evidence of dual processes in reinforcement
learning tasks is ubiquitous and these processes are often referred to as model-free and
model-based learning methods, see Niv (2009) for an overview. We therefore split our
participants into a high scoring group and a low scoring group by conducting a median
split on final score (median = 622.50). The low scoring group scored on average 335.53
(SD = 141.78) and the high scoring group scored on average 698.15 (SD = 38.56).
Visual inspection of the score trajectories in Figure 7 suggests all the participants
in the high scoring group achieve optimal behavior after roughly 300 moves, while none
but 3 out of 20 participants from the low scoring group ever achieved optimal behavior.
These results mimic results found in earlier studies (De Kleijn, Kachergis, and Hommel,
2018), and appear to suggest different modes of processing used by the groups (Freeman
and Dale, 2013). Interestingly, while only 27 out of 40 participants were able to
accurately reproduce the sequence when requested to do so after the task, all
participants performed above chance level. This suggests that some degree of learning
occurred in all participants.
Figure 7 . Score trajectories of 40 participants in the sequential
reinforcement learning task
The bimodal nature of our data lead us to question whether the relationship
between working memory and fluid intelligence on the one hand, and final score on the
other, was different for high scoring individuals compared to low scoring individuals.
We thus continued the analysis for the two groups separately.
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Table 2
Differences in cognitive attributes for low and high scoring participants
Low final score High final score
M SD M SD t p
1. Final score 349.34 151.39 698.15 38.56
2. Working memory 2.20 0.69 2.70 0.66 2.36 .012
3. Locus of control 35.50 5.33 35.60 3.49 0.07 .528
4. Personal need for structure 44.95 7.77 45.15 6.89 -0.09 .466
5. Fluid intelligence 23.50 3.27 25.85 2.82 2.44 .010
Note: Participants were split according to their score relative to the median. 20
participants per group, df = 38.
Group differences. Two sample independent t-tests showed working memory
was higher for high scoring participants (M = 2.20, SD = .69) than for low scoring
participants (M = 2.20, SD = .69), (t(38) = 2.36, p = .012). Similarly, fluid intelligence
was higher for high scoring participants (M = 25.85, SD = 2.82) than for low scoring
participants (M = 23.50, SD = 3.27), (t(38) = 2.44, p = .010). Group differences were
not found for locus of control or personal need for structure. The results are
summarized in table 2.
Correlations for subgroups. We next conducted a correlation analysis for the
low scoring group and high scoring group separately. Table 3 shows that fluid
intelligence correlates with final score in the group of low-scoring participants
(r(18)= .49, p = .027), but not in the group with high scoring participants
(r(18)= −.33, p = .153). In contrast, working memory does not correlate with final
score in either group. In the high performing group, neither working memory
(r(18) = −.17, p = .486) nor fluid intelligence (r(18) = −.33, p = .153) correlate with
final score. The relationships between working memory, fluid intelligence and final score
are shown in Figures 8 and 9.
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Table 3
Correlation table of human cognitive factors and final score, final score split on median.
Low final score High final score
M SD 1 2 3 4 M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Final score 349.34 151.39 - 698.15 38.56 -
2. Working memory 2.20 0.69 .16 (.491) - 2.70 0.66 -.17 (.486) -
3. Locus of control 35.60 5.33 .20 (.400) .00 (.988) - 35.50 3.49 - .23 (.322) -.11 (.634) -
4. Personal need for structure 44.95 7.77 -.05 (.836) -.25 (.284) .52 (.019) - 45.15 6.89 .29 (.212) -.01 (.975) -.23 (.336) -
5. Fluid intelligence 23.50 3.27 .49 (.027) .21 (.366) -.22 (.357) -.12 (.629) 25.85 2.82 -.33 (.153) -.02 (.929) -.23 (.322) -.12 (.518)
Note 1: Significant correlations (p < .05) are bold-faced.
Note 2: Unless otherwise specified, values indicate Pearson correlations, values in
brackets indicate p-values.
Figure 8 . Scatterplot comparing fluid
intelligence to final score.
*: p < .05
Figure 9 . Scatterplot comparing working
memory to final score.
Modeling results
To model participants’ behavior, we used Python 2.7 to program a reinforcement
learning agent known as a Q-learner (Watkins, 1989).
Mapping the Q-learning environment to the SLT. To mirror our
participants environment, the Q-learning agent’s environment consisted of 10 states,
representing the sequence of 10 actions required to learn the SLT. Each state
corresponded to a position in a variant of the Nissan-Bullemer sequence
(3-2-4-2-1-4-3-4-2-1, Nissen and Bullemer, 1987). Each digit in the sequence represented
the position of a participant’s mouse cursor after a correct movement. The agent had 3
action available in each state, corresponding to the 3 possible moves available to our
participants at each mouse cursor position. State transitions were realized if the agent
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took a correct action. For example in Figure 10, if the agent is in the state number 4, it
would have had to choose action 1 to reach it. This agent can only proceed to state
number 5 if it chooses action 3 when coming from state number 4. To proceed to state
number 6 from state number 5 it would have to choose action 2, etc. The agent
continued until either the sequence had been traversed successfully 80 times, or 1500
actions had been taken.
Figure 10 . Agent state transition example.
Model fitting. A model of each participant’s performance trajectory was made
by fitting the agent’s score trajectory to each participant. We maximized agent to
participant fit by tuning the agent’s parameters. In the case of softmax action selection
these parameters were learning rate α, exploration τ and reward discount γ. In the case
of -greedy action selection: learning rate α, exploration , random action decay rate
RADR and reward discount γ. Once optimized, the models produced performance
trajectories similar to that of our participants shown in Figure 7. Model to participant
fit was estimated by calculating the log-likelihood of a participant making a movement,
given the current state of model’s Q-table. Model parameters for a specific participant
were optimized by finding a parameter combination that maximized the sum of
log-likelihoods over all of that participant’s moves. The ranges of to-be-tested
parameter combinations were defined a-priori (α: range = [0, 1]; τ = [0, 5];  = [0, 1],
RADR = [0, 1], γ = [0, 1]). From these ranges were generated 50 evenly spaced values
per parameter, thus leading to a total of 50 ∗ 50 ∗ 50 ∗ 50 = 6250000 to-be-tested
parameter combinations for −greedy action selection, and 50 ∗ 50 ∗ 50 = 125000
to-be-tested parameter combinations for softmax action selection. Each parameter
combination was run 200 times, and the average log-likelihood was calculated. To speed
up computation we used a virtual 64-thread CPU from the Google Compute service.
Log likelihoods and optimized parameter values are shown in Table E1 (Appendix).
Model identifiability. We investigated identifiability of our Q-learner with
regard to model to participant fit by generating heat maps of parameter combinations
for each participant, such as the ones shown in Figures 11 - 13 for participant 4. We
used min-max feature scaling to force all values of log-likelihood to lie between 0 and 1
and raised them to the 10th power to correct a severe left skew. Figures 11 - 13 suggest
that parameter combinations appear to converge to a global maximum log-likelihood. It
appears that a single unique parameter combination corresponds with the highest
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log-likelihood and thus leading us to conclude that the participant models generated by
our agent are, indeed, identifiable. Heat maps for all participants are shown in Figures
C1 - C3 (Appendix).
Figure 11 . Heat map for
participant 4 showing
values of log-likelihood for
different combinations of α
and γ.
Figure 12 . Heat map for
participant 4 showing
values of log-likelihood for
different combinations of τ
and α.
Figure 13 . Heat map for
participant 4 showing
values of log-likelihood for
different combinations of τ
and γ.
Selecting an action selection method. To decide between softmax and
-greedy action selection methods, we calculated the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) for each of our participants’ fitted models. BIC is a measure of fitness that uses
log-likelihood combined with a complexity penalty to aid in method selection. We found
that BIC scores for softmax action selection method were consistently lower than for
-greedy action selection, leading us to conclude that softmax action selection was
preferable over the alternative. BIC scores are found in Table E1 (Appendix).
Relationships between optimized parameters and final score. We next
investigated the relationship between the model’s optimized parameters using softmax
action selection and final score, the results of which are shown in Table 4. Of note is the
high correlation between γ and α, and γ and τ , suggesting an underlying mechanism at
work influencing the relationship between γ and the other 2 parameters. Histograms of
all 3 parameters are found in Figure A2 (Appendix).
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Table 4
Correlation table showing the relationship between optimized model parameters and
participants’ final score.
Final score α τ γ
Final score -
α .28 (.085) -
τ -.82 (<.001) .16 (.338) -
γ -.35 (.025) .52 (.001) .72 (<.001) -
Note 1: Significant correlations (p < .05) are bold-faced.
Note 2: Unless otherwise specified, values indicate Pearson correlations, values in
brackets indicate p-values.
Figure 14 . Relationship
between optimized α and
participants’ final score.
Figure 15 . Relationship
between optimized τ and
participants’ final score.
***: p < .001
Figure 16 . Relationship
between optimized γ and
participants’ final score.
*: p < .05
The relationship between α and final score, shown in Figure 14, appears linear
and positive, although not quite reaching significance (r(38)= .28, p = .085). This
suggests updating Q-values by larger increments leads to higher final scores. In terms of
human performance, this suggests that higher learning rates, i.e. faster updating of
internal models of the paradigm, are associated with higher final scores.
The relationship between τ and final score, shown in Figure 15, is strongly
negative (r(38)= −.82, p < .001). This suggests that more exploratory behavior is
related to lower scores. In terms of human performance, regular exploration is
associated with lower final scores. Furthermore, the non-linearity of the relationship
suggests that effect becomes stronger the more one explores. Post-hoc regression of final
score onto τ (b = −1065.78, t(38) = −8.91, p < .001) yielded a linear model
(F (1, 38) = 79.38, p < .001) which explained 66.7% of the variance in our data
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(R2adj = .667). Adding a second order polynomial term improved the model significantly
(F (1, 37) = 26.027, p < .001). Regressing final score onto τ (b = −1065.78,
t(37) = −11.47, p < .001) and τ 2 (b = −473.86, t(37) = −5.10, p < .001) yielded a
polynomial model (F (2, 37) = 78.84, p < .001) which explained 80.0% of the variance in
final score(R2adj = .799).
The relationship between γ and final score, shown in Figure 16, is negative
(r(38)= −.35, p = .025) but strongly non-linear, suggesting that both high and low
values of γ are associated with high final scores, but that only high values of γ are
associated with low scores. Importantly, 16 suggests a strongly non-linear relationship,
which cannot be described by a Pearson correlation.
In accordance with our analysis of how human factors were associated with final
score, we conducted a median split on final score. We then investigated the relationship
between optimized parameters and final score for each subset of low and high scoring
individuals. The results are shown in Table 5 and Figures 17 - 19.
Table 5
Correlation table of optimized model parameters and final score, final score split on
median.
Low final score High final score
Final score α τ γ Final score α τ γ
α .17 (.465) - .45 (.049) -
τ -.66 (.002) .31 (.179) - -.20 (.391) .69 (.001) -
γ -.36 (.116) .44 (.052) .81 (< .001) - .21 (.373) .72 (<.001) .79 (<.001) -
Note 1: Significant correlations (p < .05) are bold-faced.
Note 2: Unless otherwise specified, values indicate Pearson correlations, values in
brackets indicate p-values.
In the low scoring group of participants, final score significantly negatively
correlated with τ (r(18) = −.66, p = .002). This suggests that for low scoring
individuals, the more they explored, the lower their score.
In contrast, in the high scoring group of participants, final score is significantly
positively correlated significantly with α (r(18) = .45, p = .049). This suggests that for
high scoring individuals, the higher their learning rate, the higher their score.
γ Did not correlate significantly with final score in either low (r(18) = −.36,
p = .116) or high scoring group (r(18) = .21, p = .373).
COMPUTATIONAL CORRELATES OF INTELLIGENCE AND WORKING
MEMORY 22
Figure 17 . Relationship
between optimized α and
participants’ final score.
*: p < .05
Figure 18 . Relationship
between optimized τ and
participants’ final score.
**: p < .01
Figure 19 . Relationship
between optimized γ and
participants’ final score.
Taken together, it appears as though learning and exploration rate affect final
score dependent on whether the participant was a high or low performer. High learning
rates only benefit performance if you are already a good performer, while poor
performers are more helped by following what they already know, rather than by
exploring other options.
Relating human cognitive functioning to model parameters
Next, we investigated the relationship between our agent’s optimized parameter
values for α, τ and γ on the one hand, and on the other hand the human cognitive
attributes that were shown to be related to task performance: working memory and
fluid intelligence. The results, shown in Table 6, reflect that the only statistically
significant relationship between a human cognitive attribute and a parameter is the
mapping of τ onto fluid intelligence (r(38) = −.41, p = .009). Associations that
approached significance were between working memory and τ (r(38) = −.29, p = .067)
and fluid intelligence and α (r(38) = −.28, p = .075). The associations between
participant attributes and agent parameters are shown in Figures 20 to 25.
Fluid intelligence regressed onto a linear combination of α (b = −6.42,
t(36) = −1.82,p = .077), τ (b = −1.84, t(36) = 2.41, p = .021) and γ (b = 3.05,
t(36) = 0.99, p = .329) yielded a statistically significant model
(F (3, 36) = 3.77, p = .0189) which explained 17,5% (of the variance in fluid intelligence
R2adj = .175). Collinearity measures were acceptable, with VIF/tolerances for α, τ and γ
measured as 1.59/.628, 2.41/.415 and 3.23/.310 respectively. No significant regression
model was found that predicted working memory.
COMPUTATIONAL CORRELATES OF INTELLIGENCE AND WORKING
MEMORY 23
Table 6
Correlation table showing the relationship between optimized model parameters, working
memory and fluid intelligence.
Working memory Fluid intelligence α τ γ
Working memory -
Fluid intelligence .22 (.163) -
α -.03 (.835) -.28 (.075) -
τ -.29 (.067) -.41 (.009) .16 (.338) -
γ -.12 (.466) -.31 (.053) .52 (.001) .72 (<.001) -
Note 1: Significant correlations (p < .05) are bold-faced.
Note 2: Unless otherwise specified, values indicate Pearson correlations, values in
brackets indicate p-values.
We next calculated correlations for low and high final score separately, as shown
in Table 7.
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Figure 20 . Relationship
between optimized α and
participants’ fluid
intelligence.
+: p < .1
Figure 21 . Relationship
between optimized τ and
participants’ fluid
intelligence.
**: p < .01
Figure 22 . Relationship
between optimized γ and
participants’ fluid
intelligence.
+: p < .1
Figure 23 . Relationship
between optimized α and
participants’ working
memory.
Figure 24 . Relationship
between optimized τ and
participants’ working
memory.
+: p < .1
Figure 25 . Relationship
between optimized γ and
participants’ working
memory.
Table 7
Correlation table of optimized model parameters and final score, final score split on
median.
Low final score High final score
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1. Fluid intelligence - -
2. Working memory .21 (.388) - -.02 (.929) -
3. α -.10 (.679) -.02 (.936) - -.63 (.003) -.19 (.425) -
4. τ -.06 (.794) -.09 (.692) .31 (.179) - -.40 (.084) .05 (.849) .69 (.001) -
5. γ .06 (.802) .09 (.694) .44 (.052) .81 (< .001) -.44 (.052) -.07 (.771) .72 (< .001) .79 (< .001)
Significant correlations (p < .05) are bold.
Table 7 shows that in the low performing group, there is no relationship between
participant attributes and model parameters. Intercorrelation between parameters is
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limited to τ and γ (r(18) = .84, p < .001).
In the high scoring group, α correlates negatively with fluid intelligence
(r(18) = −.63, p = .003), lower learning rates correspond to higher fluid intelligence.
Furthermore, there is intercorrelation between α and τ (r(18) = .69, p = .001), α and γ
r(18) = .72, p < .001 and τ and γ (r(18) = .79, p < .001). Consequently, the correlation
between fluid intelligence on the one hand, and τ and γ on the other also approached
significance. Furthermore, fluid intelligence regressed onto a linear combination of α
(b = −8.80, t(16) = −2.30, p = .035), τ (b = .04, t(16) = 0.25, p = .804) and γ
(b = −.27, t(16) = −0.09, p = .9322) yielded a statistically significant model
(F (3, 36) = 3.77, p = .0189) which explained 17.5% of the variance in fluid intelligence
(R2adj = .175). Interestingly, when all parameters were entered as predictors, only α
remained statistically significant. Low semi-partial correlations of τ (r = .063) and γ (r
= -.022) indicate that their initial correlation with fluid intelligence disappears when
controlled for by α, leaving only the latter as an explanatory variable for fluid
intelligence.
No linear combination of parameters significantly predicted working memory in
either low or high performers. Of further note in Table 7 is the absence of parameter
correlates with fluid intelligence and working memory in the low performing group.
Taken together with the correlation between final score and fluid intelligence, this result
suggests that fluid intelligence and τ are separate, non-overlapping factors, both
contributing to final score.
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Discussion
In the present study we investigated the influence of human cognitive and
personality attributes on performance in a sequential learning task (SLT). To that end
we built a model-free reinforcement-learning agent known as a Q-learner and
investigated the mechanism by which parameters correlating with human cognitive
attributes influenced the participant’s final score.
The influence of cognitive attributes on sequential learning task performance
Our initial results showed both fluid intelligence and visuospatial working memory
capacity (working memory), but not locus of control or personal need for structure
correlated with performance on the SLT, thus replicating earlier results suggesting that
cognitive attributes and not personality attributes affect performance on this task
(Kleijn et al., 2018). In regression, working memory and fluid intelligence explained
19% of the variance in final score. This finding is partially in line with earlier findings
that correlate working memory with performance on implicit sequence learning tasks
(Bo et al., 2011; Jin Bo, Jennett, and Seidler, 2012). However, this finding is not
uncontested, as other studies found working memory to correlate with performance only
when participants received explicit instructions, but not under implicit conditions
(Unsworth and Engle, 2005; Yang and Li, 2012; Guzmán Muñoz, 2018).
Similarly, studies suggest that fluid intelligence correlates with scores on motor
sequence learning tasks sequence when participants are explicitly instructed to learn a
sequence, but not when the learning is implicit in the task (Unsworth and Engle, 2005;
Gebauer and Mackintosh, 2007). Our results appear to contradict these findings as our
study did not feature explicit learning instructions. However, this apparent
contradiction can be explained by our task’s lack of distractor tasks, lack of stochastic
or higher order components and non-deceptive and simple instructions: "Maximize your
score". These factors may have simplified the task to the extent that a participant can
easily identify the task goal of finding a sequence and thus reformulate the instructions
to "Find the sequence". Importantly, easy recognition of the SLT as a sequence learning
task did not imply the task was easy, given that 27 out of 40 participants were unable
to correctly reproduce the sequence.
Visual inspection of the histogram of final score indicated that final score was
distributed bimodally. Previous studies have shown that a bimodal distribution of
participants scores can be attributed to different modes of processing (Freeman and
Dale, 2013; Kachergis et al., 2016), so we conducted a median split on final score to
investigate the sequence learning process in low and high scoring participants separately.
We found a strong association between fluid intelligence and final score in the low
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performers but this relationship was absent in high performers. Given that studies show
that fluid intelligence and final score are unrelated in implicit sequence learning tasks,
one admittedly speculative explanation for our result is that low performers treat the
task as if they had received explicit instructions. However, several pieces of evidence
point against such a claim. First, receiving explicit instructions in the SRT has been
found to lead to better recall of the sequence (Willingham and Goedert-Eschmann,
1999), whereas in our sample only 7 out of 20 low scoring participants correctly recalled
the sequence. Second, research shows a clear relationship between working memory
capacity and sequence learning, which we did not find in the group of low performing
participants. We can thus only infer the use of an explicit learning strategy through the
correlation between fluid intelligence and final score and the ease with which the task
can be identified as a sequence learning task. Future studies should aim to further
elucidate how fluid intelligence and working memory influence score in an implicit
learning task when the sequence is not learned.
To further elucidate and differentiate the learning mechanisms of low and high
scoring participants we modeled our participant’s behavior on the SLT using a
model-free reinforcement learning algorithm known as Q-learning.
The impact of Q-learning parameters on modeled SLT performance.
We optimized a Q-learning agent to participant fit by modulating 3 free
parameters: α, τ and γ. We found significant correlations between final score on the
one hand, and algorithm parameters τ and γ on the other. However, when final scores
were once again split according to low and high scorers, we found γ no longer correlated
with final score in either group.
Low final score. In the group of low performers only τ and fluid intelligence
correlated with final score. However, τ and fluid intelligence did not correlate,
indicating that τ may explain a part of the variance in final score that is not explained
by fluid intelligence.
To investigate we conducted a post-hoc regression of final score onto fluid
intelligence, revealing a model explaining 20% of the variance in final score
(F (1, 18) = 5.803, p = .027, R2adj = .202. Fluid intelligence significantly predicted final
score bfluid = 22.869, t = 2.409, p = .027). Adding τ to the model revealed a model
explaining 60% of the variance in final score (F (2, 17) = 15, p < .001, R2adj = .596),
improving the model significantly (F (1, 17) = 18.545, p < .001). A high final score was
predicted significantly by both high fluid intelligence (b = 21.055, p = .006) and low τ
(b = −151.689, p < .001). Multicollinearity statistics did not suggest model instability
or variance overlap (VIF and tolerance were 1 and .996 respectively.) It thus appears
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that the variance in final score for low performers is best explained by both fluid
intelligence and τ as separate, non correlating predictors.
The role of τ in low performers. Algorithmically, τ parameterizes the extent
to which an agent explores its environment by modulating the conversion of expected
rewards to action probabilities. It is not part of the Q-learning algorithm proper, but
rather part of the action selection mechanism. High values of τ cause actions to be
equally likely regardless of expected reward, thus mimicking exploration. Low values
cause large differences between action probabilities depending on expected reward,
mimicking exploitation. In the low performing group, τ is negatively correlated with
final score, indicating that exploitation of acquired sequence knowledge is associated
with a higher final score. Furthermore, only 3 out of 20 of the score trajectories in this
group show a curve consistent with having learned the correct sequence. Lastly, better
than chance performance was found in all of our participants. Taken together these
observations suggest that while the low scoring participants likely sought to learn a
sequence, this sequence was partially incorrect. Thus, when sequence knowledge was
exploited, this led to higher, but not high scores. Interestingly, 7 out of 20 of our low
scoring participants were able to reproduce the correct sequence after the task was
completed. This points to an alternative hypothesis, suggesting that some low scoring
participants had learned the correct sequence, but then chose to act in opposition to
this knowledge. A recent study suggest that such exploratory behavior is related to the
Openness to experience personality construct (Mikulincer, Shaver, Cooper, Larsen, and
DeYoung, 2015). Thus, future studies investigating the nature of sequence learning
should include personality measures such as openness or extraversion, potentially
leading to correlates of τ and thus yield information into how these personality
measures affect performance in sequence learning.
High final score. In the group of high performers, only α correlated with final
score. No cognitive or personality measures correlated with final score. However, α
correlated strongly negative with fluid intelligence. Taken together these observations
appear to imply that while α and fluid intelligence overlap, this overlap plays no role
task performance. Rather, a unique component of α not explained by fluid intelligence
is engaged in order to maximize task score. Post-hoc regression appears to support this
suggestion. Regressing final score onto α revealed a model explaining 15% of the
variance in final score (F (1, 18) = 4.479, p = .049, R2adj = .155. α Significantly predicted
final score bα = 80.94, t = 2.116, p = .049). Adding fluid intelligence to the model
reduced explanatory power to 11% of the variance in final score
(F (2, 17) = 2.179, p = .144, R2adj = .110). Multicollinearity statistics did not find
evidence for the presence of function instability or variance overlap (VIF and tolerance
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1.65 and .604 respectively.). It thus appears that variance in final score for high
performers is explained by the variance in α that not correlated with fluid intelligence.
The role of α in high performers. Algorithmically, learning rate α modulates
the sensitivity of existing Q-values to receiving a reward. Specifically, high α values
cause Q-values to take on values close to the reward regardless of starting Q-value, and
low α values cause Q-values to remain close to the starting Q-value regardless of the
value of the reward. See Equation 1 for further details. One way in which α can explain
performance in the SLT in humans, is if humans possess a mechanism that supports the
representation of the values and evaluation of actions and their rewards. Furthermore,
this system must be implicit and must learn and update action values conditional on
state without using a model of the environment. Lastly, given that the system is
implicit, the mechanism must work without executive functions such as intelligence and
working memory. Indeed, much research has shown that a subcortical/striatal network
of brain areas exists that supports a mechanism for representation, evaluation and
conditional updating of action values based on prediction error and as such can support
model-free reinforcement learning ( Niv, Edlund, Dayan, and O’Doherty, 2012; Behrens,
Woolrich, Walton, and Rushworth, 2007; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, and O’Doherty, 2010;
FitzGerald, Friston, and Dolan, 2012; Wunderlich, Dayan, and Dolan, 2012; Niv, 2009).
Furthermore, these areas appear to correspond to areas that are associated with
implicit motor sequence learning (Frank, Seeberger, and O’Reilly, 2004; Jin and Costa,
2010; Rauch, Savage, et al., 1997; Rauch, Whalen, et al., 1997; Ungerleider, Doyon, and
Karni, 2002). It thus appears as though high performers perform better the more
sensitive they are to reward, and that the brain contains an implicit system that
evaluates action values and rewards to guide behavior. Future studies should aim to
further elucidate sequence learning behavior in high performers by combining imaging
techniques with the SLT, and investigate correlates between areas of interest and a
reinforcement learning model such as Q-learning.
Limitations
Sample. The present study is under powered, which became apparent after we
split our sample. This may have lead to Type II errors. Future studies should aim for
higher sample sizes.
Furthermore, it remains unclear why 7 out of 20 low scoring participants could
accurately reproduce the sequence post task, while at the same time not acting in
accordance with the sequence. Motivation could be lacking, as the SLT is both
repetitive and lengthy. To investigate its impact, future studies should measure and
enter motivation as a co-variate when examining human performance in the SLT.
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Parameter identifiability. Judging by Figures C1 - C3 (Appendix), our
models of participant behavior may not be identifiable. Thus, different parameter
combinations can yield similar cost function values. This may be a result of reduced
precision resulting from a lack of convergence, or simply in the nature of the model.
Future studies should investigate this phenomenon and seek to combat it though
improved precision or alternative RL agents such as SARSA
(state-action-reward-state-action).
Correcting for multiple testing. As the present study was exploratory, no
Bonferroni correction for multiple testing was applied. However, the probability of type
I errors will have increased as a result of multiple testing and should be corrected for in
future studies.
Future reward discount. In Q-learning, a Q-value is partially updated by
adding to the present Q-value the reward for having arrived in the present state and a
discounted reward for taking the most rewarding action in the next state (see Equation
1). The future reward discount parameter γ parameterizes the extent to which the
algorithm values rewards from future actions. Specifically, γ values close to 0 cause the
algorithm to value primarily immediate rewards and values close to 1 cause the
algorithm to value primarily long term rewards. The distinction between short term
and long term reward is valuable when reward maximization requires short term
sacrifice. This is evident in, for example, navigation problems that yield large rewards
when a destination is reached, but deduct a small reward for each step taken to reach
the destination. Reinforcement learning agents can learn that to reach a destination
sometimes requires taking a detour. The degree to which an agent allows such detours
is modulated by γ.
In the SLT, maximization of rewards does not require short term sacrifice. In fact,
long term reward is always the arithmetic sum of short term rewards, and maximizing
short term reward is synonymous with maximizing long term reward. This easy rule
may explain why optimized γ values do not correlate with cognitive of personality
attributes. However, 35 out of 40 optimized γ values are between .75 and 1.
Furthermore, Figure 19 hints at a non-linear relationship between final score and γ that
is not captured by a Pearson correlation. These findings suggest that γ may yet play a
role in optimizing agent to participant fit, but that our current data set may contain
outliers resulting from sub-optimal fitting. Alternatively, splitting our data may have
underpowered our study causing a type II error or, perhaps the relationship between γ
and human performance cannot be captured through linear models.
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Conclusion
Previous studies have been inconclusive with regard to how fluid intelligence and
working memory influence score on implicit motor learning tasks. The present study
suggests this ambiguity may be related to having two populations in a sample taking
the task, each population using different learning methods. Low-performing individuals’
score can be explained through a combination of fluid intelligence and trait exploration.
High performing individuals’ performance however, appears unrelated to fluid
intelligence and working memory. Rather, the scores of high performers can be best
viewed through the lens of model-free reinforcement learning and are best predicted by
the learning rate parameter α. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the
first to predict human behavior from reinforcement parameters. This direct mapping of
algorithm to behavior gives insight into the nature of human performance, and in the
future, will allow machines incorporating such algorithms to learn and behave more like
humans.
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Appendix A: Univariate distributions
Figure A1 . Histograms of behavioral data
Figure A2 . Histograms of computational data
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Appendix B: Scatterplots
Figure B1 . Scatterplot comparing fluid
intelligence to final score.
**: p < .01
Figure B2 . Scatterplot comparing
working memory to final score.
*: p < .05
Figure B3 . Scatterplot comparing
locus of control to final score.
Figure B4 . Scatterplot comparing
personal need for structure to final
score.
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Appendix C: Heatmaps
Figure C1 . Fitness heatmaps of parameters γ and α for all 40 participant models.
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Figure C2 . Fitness heatmaps of parameters τ and α for all 40 participant models..
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Figure C3 . Fitness heatmaps of parameters γ and τ for all 40 participant models..
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Appendix D: Regression assumptions
Figure D1 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 1.
Figure D2 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 2.
Figure D3 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 3.
Figure D4 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 4.
Figure D5 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 1, final score squared.
Figure D6 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 2, final score squared.
Figure D7 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 3, final score squared.
Figure D8 . Residual and QQ plot for
regression model 4, final score squared.
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Appendix E: Participant and model details
Table E1
Final score, optimized parameters, cognitive and personality scores, BIC and
log-likelihood for each participant
Participant Score α τ γ Working Locus of Personal need Fluid Explicit BIC log-
memory control for structure intelligence knowledge likelihood
1 736 0.63 1.13 0.88 2.04 39 41 22 1 399.99 -189.86
2 701 0.30 1.01 0.78 2.94 33 57 22 0 704.43 -342.01
3 644 0.40 1.76 0.93 1.59 35 36 28 1 886.70 -433.06
4 472 0.14 1.68 1.00 2.24 37 53 25 1 1493.25 -736.08
5 542 0.39 2.90 1.00 2.07 39 43 28 1 1336.67 -657.89
6 457 0.35 2.37 0.95 2.36 38 49 21 0 1711.09 -844.98
7 579 0.46 2.02 0.94 2.36 33 46 24 0 1193.77 -586.49
8 724 0.38 1.11 0.86 1.96 36 49 28 1 477.47 -228.58
9 709 0.47 1.26 0.87 2.86 37 47 21 1 624.26 -301.95
10 740 0.45 1.27 0.90 3.77 33 41 26 1 395.37 -187.55
11 703 0.43 1.25 0.86 1.93 35 54 27 1 582.16 -280.88
12 614 0.05 0.43 0.05 1.91 41 40 24 1 1134.40 -556.86
13 160 0.21 3.01 0.96 3.24 42 52 23 0 2826.93 -1402.56
14 213 0.32 3.07 0.96 0.54 31 52 25 0 2588.75 -1283.52
15 737 0.55 1.36 0.92 2.53 33 45 22 1 363.14 -171.43
16 683 0.56 1.90 0.96 2.60 35 44 21 1 644.36 -311.95
17 709 0.12 0.47 0.32 3.50 33 46 27 1 711.99 -345.81
18 266 0.28 2.43 0.90 3.21 36 43 26 1 2477.34 -1227.88
19 723 0.05 0.27 0.37 2.63 36 34 27 1 513.76 -246.72
20 223 0.22 3.15 0.99 1.53 36 50 23 0 2599.09 -1288.70
21 705 0.05 0.41 0.74 2.13 32 48 29 1 672.97 -326.29
22 362 0.34 2.47 0.94 2.81 36 35 19 0 2060.09 -1019.37
23 140 0.36 2.72 0.90 1.87 43 58 15 0 2912.41 -1445.28
24 659 0.05 0.36 0.00 1.93 38 35 29 1 932.50 -455.98
25 141 0.13 2.97 0.99 2.64 18 30 23 0 2912.23 -1445.19
26 381 0.21 2.67 1.00 2.31 40 45 26 1 2010.20 -994.44
27 262 0.23 2.90 0.97 2.47 35 47 24 0 2492.41 -1235.41
28 451 0.39 2.34 0.93 2.03 38 58 24 0 1692.19 -835.53
29 333 0.20 2.69 0.98 1.83 33 42 25 0 2254.30 -1116.43
30 687 0.41 1.75 0.96 3.67 38 39 27 1 631.05 -305.30
31 631 0.36 2.23 1.00 3.36 29 43 28 1 919.32 -449.35
32 488 0.29 2.69 1.00 3.40 33 35 27 1 1601.53 -790.25
33 686 0.05 0.52 0.84 3.01 34 56 28 1 804.94 -392.25
34 372 0.32 3.13 1.00 1.99 32 47 25 1 2031.30 -1004.98
35 392 0.25 2.73 0.98 2.04 34 38 26 0 1990.35 -984.53
36 648 0.36 1.64 0.93 3.16 44 48 25 1 824.84 -402.14
37 725 0.58 1.52 0.94 2.57 42 43 24 1 444.92 -212.30
38 639 0.01 0.10 0.01 3.59 35 41 29 1 950.23 -464.82
39 141 0.24 2.99 0.94 1.09 37 36 17 0 2904.87 -1441.50
40 774 0.64 0.74 0.79 2.30 33 56 27 1 224.34 -102.10
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Appendix F: Regression models
Table F1
Regression models for hierarchical regression
Unstandardized Standardized
coefficients coefficients
Step Predictor B SE β t df p R2adj F df p
1. (Constant) -291364 220860 -1.32 38 .195 .147 7.70 1,38 .009
Fluid intelligence 24629 8877 0.410 2.78 38 .009
2. (Constant) -376884 220699 -1.71 37 .096 .190 5.57 2,37 .008
Fluid intelligence 21153 8875 0.353 2.38 37 .022
Working memory 69903 40121 0.258 1.74 37 .090
3. (Constant) -645104 352788 -1.83 36 .076 .190 4.03 3,36 .014
Fluid intelligence 22968 9074 0.383 2.53 36 .016
Working memory 69862 40148 0.258 1.74 36 .090
Locus of control 6288 6450 0.144 0.98 36 .336
4. (Constant) -723135 386584 -1.87 35 .070 .172 3.03 4,35 .030
Fluid intelligence 23184 9177 .386 2.53 35 .016
Working memory 72106 40788 .266 1.77 35 .086
Locus of control 5497 6690 .126 0.82 35 .417
Personal need for structure 2116 4060 .079 0.52 35 .606
Note: N = 40
